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POLICY COORDINATION: THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AS AMICUS CURIAE IN THE FIRST
TWO YEARS OF THE ROBERTS COURT
Ryan Juliano*
This Note examines the success of the Solicitor General as amicus
curiae before the Supreme Court of the United States, with a particular
focus on the first two years of the Roberts Court. Between 2005 and
2007, the Court ruled in favor of the party supported by the Solicitor
General in 89.06 percent of the cases decided on the merits. This success-rate exceeds both the historical average-about 75 percent-and
the success rate of any prior Solicitor General. The high success rate
has its own significance, because it indicates the (relatively and absolutely) high coordinationbetween the policy outcomes of the Court's decisions and the policy preferences of the Executive. Both the historical
success rate of the Solicitor General and its particularlyhigh success
before the Roberts Court pose a number of interesting and important
causal questions. While the Note examines many of the possible causal
explanationsfor its findings, it ultimately determines that accurate conclusions about causation require information and analysis beyond its
scope.
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INTRODUCTION

The Solicitor General represents the Executive Branch of the federal
government before the Supreme Court of the United States.' One of its
chief functions is to file amicus curiae ("friend of the court") briefs for
2
litigants before the Court when the United States is not a direct party.
Between the Fall 2005 and Spring 2007 terms of the Supreme Court, the
Solicitor General submitted amicus briefs on the merits in seventy-one
cases. 3 Previous empirical studies demonstrate the Solicitor General's
dramatic historical success 4 as amicus curiae. 5 While there are several
possible causal explanations for this success, the coincidence of the Solicitor General's support and the Court's decisions is meaningful in and
of itself. The Solicitor General's high success rate indicates that the
Court's decisions are generally in line with the Executive Branch's policy preferences.
This Note empirically examines how often the young Roberts Court
and its individual Justices ruled in favor of the position supported by the
Solicitor General's office. I find that the Court sided with the Solicitor
General in nearly 90 percent of the cases examined. This rate of success
far exceeds those obtained in studies of earlier periods. I argue that this
correlation is meaningful in that it demonstrates systematic policy coordination between the executive and judicial branches. Part I of this Note
will provide background on the history of amicus curiae participation in
the Supreme Court, the function of the Solicitor General, and prior empirical studies of the influence of the Solicitor General and other amicus
curiae in the Supreme Court. Part II will present original data regarding
I See Office of the Solicitor General, About the Office of the Solicitor General, http://
www.usdoj.gov/osg/about.us.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008); see also Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor GeneralDuring the Warren and Burger Courts: A Research
Note, 41 W. POL. Q. 135, 135 (1988).
2 Segal, supra note 1, at 135.
3 See Office of the Solicitor General, Type of Filing by Term, http://www.usdoj.gov/
osg/briefs/brieftype.htm/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (making available all briefs submitted by
the Office of the Solicitor General from 1997 through 2007). This Note only offers analysis of
sixty-four cases. Cases in which either the Solicitor General or the Court's decision was unclear were omitted from the sample.
4 By "success," I mean instances in which the Court ruled in favor of the side supported
by the Solicitor General. I use the word cautiously, given the theoretical role of an amicus
curiae as a source of new information and legal argument, rather than an interested party. See
infra pp. 543-44.
5 See Karen O'Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256, 261 (1983) ("[T]he solicitor general's success

rate as amicus curiae surpasses the high win-loss ratio that the government enjoys as a party to
a suit .... "). See generally Segal, supra note 1, at 136 (finding that the Solicitor General won
about 75 percent of the time in the Warren and Burger Courts, confirming the results of three
other studies).
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how often the Court and each Justice accepted the position supported by
the Solicitor General from the Fall 2005 term through the Spring 2007
term. Part III compares the findings from Part II to those from earlier
empirical studies and interprets these new findings. The final section
concludes.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The History of Amicus Participationin the Supreme Court

Supreme Court Rule 37 governs amicus curiae participation.6 The
Supreme Court Rules have in broad outline remained unchanged since
they were first promulgated in 1939. 7 As they now stand, the rules permit government representatives like the Solicitor General, federal agencies, or individual states to file amicus curiae briefs in any case. 8 Nongovernmental entities may file an amicus curiae brief in any case if they
obtain the consent of all parties or leave to file from the Court itself.9
Despite the literal translation of amicus curiae, amici briefs are not neutral sources of information; they are "most commonly submitted to the
Court urging the Justices to rule in favor of one litigant over another."' 1
The last century has seen a major transformation in the extent to
which "non-parties participate in the Court's decision-making process
through the submission of amicus curiae briefs."" Not only are more
cases attracting amicus filings, but the intensity of participation is also
rising.' 2 While amicus briefs were filed in only about 23 percent of the
Court's cases from 1946-1955, amicus briefs were filed in 85 percent of
the Court's cases argued from 1986-1995.13 Between 1946 and 1995,
the average number of amicus briefs per case jumped from about 0.50
per case to 4.23 per case-an 846 percent increase. 14 In the same period,
6 SUP. CT. R. 37.

7 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. Rev. 743, 761 (2000). Kearney and Merrill later make note
of a significant 1997 amendment, requiring the disclosure of certain relationships between the
parties to the case and any person or entity that files an amicus brief. See id. at 766. However,
the rules explicitly exempt from this requirement certain governmental representatives, including the Solicitor General. SuP. CT. R. 37.6.
8 See Sup. CT. R. 37.4.
9 See Sup. CT. R. 37.3. In practice, the requirement of consent or leave is only a formal
obstacle, as the Court has come to grant nearly all motions for leave to file as amicus curiae.
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 762 & n.58 (reporting that the Rehnquist Court denied
only one out of 115 motions for leave to file in 1990).
10 Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participationin U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & Soc'y REv. 807, 808 (2004).
11 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 744.
12 See id. at 754.
13 See id. (basing their figure on original data).
14 See id. (noting also that the mean number of amicus briefs per case, when expressed in
terms of the cases in which one or more amicus briefs were filed, rose from 2.12 to 5.00).
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the median number of briefs jumped from one to three. 15 This increased

participation has not gone unnoticed by the members of the Court. In
cases where at least one amicus curiae filed a brief, the percentage of
decisions referencing an amicus rose from 18 percent between 1946 and

1955 to 37 percent between 1986 and 1995.16 Similarly, in cases where
at least one amicus curiae filed a brief, the percentage of decisions actually quoting one or more of the amici's briefs from 1986-1995 was about
7
double that of the previous three decades.'
Members of the legal community have put forth several competing
hypotheses regarding the utility and impact of amicus filings. 18 The critical variable that divides these perspectives is the model of judicial decision-making underlying each. 19 The Legal Model is perhaps most
familiar to lawyers. 20 This model "posits that Justices resolve cases in
accordance with their understanding of the requirements of the authoritative sources of law relevant to the question presented. ' 2 1 Accordingly,
under the Legal Model, amicus curiae briefs that provide new information or legal arguments can, and should, aid the Court in making its decisions. 22 Skeptics of the Legal Model contend that it merely serves to
rationalize judicial decisions based on other grounds. 23
The Attitudinal Model provides an alternative to the Legal Model
and has become the predominant model in political science scholarship. 24
15 See id.
16 See id. at 757. Kearney and Merrill mention higher figures from another study, but
dismiss these figures because of the study's methods. See id. at 757 n.42 (discussing the
results from Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. &
POL. 639, 650 (1993)).
17 See Kearney & Merril, supra note 7, at 758.
18 See id. at 774-87 (exploring three competing models of judicial behavior and each
model's corresponding view of amicus filings).
19 See id. at 747.
20 See id. at 775.
21 Id. at 775-76.
22 See id. at 748; see also Sup. CT. R. 37.1 ("An amicus curiae brief that brings to the
attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be
of considerable help to the Court."); cf Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 815 (describing how
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the exclusionary rule to the states when the issue
was ignored by both parties and raised only by an amici, the American Civil Liberties Union).
Under the same logic, briefs that do not provide new information or logic do not (and should
not) influence decisions and merely burden the court. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at
776; see also Sup. CT. R. 37.1 (noting that briefs that do not provide new information are "not
favored").
23 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrlTuDINAL MODEL REvIsrED 66-75, 86 (2003) (questioning the value of the Legal Model in light
of the fact that "various aspects of the legal model can support either side of any given dispute
that comes before the Court").
24 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 252 n.4 (1997) ("The attitudinal model has achieved predominance in political science scholarship.").
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This model posits that Justices decide cases in accordance with their political beliefs 25 which are assumed to be fixed by the time a Justice is
appointed to the Court.2 6 In its basic form, the Attitudinal Model suggests that amicus briefs will have no discernable impact on judicial deci28 It
sion-making, 27 though individual exceptions are easily conceived.
should be noted that skeptics of the Attitudinal Model regard it as overly
29
reductionistic.
Some scholars have expanded the Attitudinal Model in accordance
with the Strategic Actor Model. 30 Under this expansion, Justices modify
their voting behavior in order to maximize the chances of their ideological preferences actually being adopted as policy. 31 As a result, advocates
of the Strategic Actor strand of the Attitudinal Model predict that Justices pay close attention to amicus briefs from key institutional actors
(such as the Solicitor General) who represent parties responsible for
32
adopting policy.
Finally, the Interest Group Model hypothesizes that "Justices will
seek to resolve cases in accordance with the desires of the organized
groups that have an interest in the controversy. ' 33 Not only has this
model gained acceptance amongst some legal scholars, 34 but it may be
the "dominant conception" amongst amicus filers. 35 The central criticism of the Interest Group Model is that Supreme Court Justices, who
25 See SEGAL & SPATH, supra note

23, at 86.

See generally id. at 86-97.
27 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 781 ("In short, the attitudinal model generates
what statisticians would call the null hypothesis: amicus briefs will have no discernible impact
on outcomes."); SEGAL & SPAErH, supra note 23, at 237-38 (noting that their research on the
impact of Solicitor General amicus briefs demonstrates that the Solicitor General may have
non-attitudinal influence on the Court).
28 See Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 816 ("[A] [J]ustice not particularly pleased by the
arguments of the direct party to litigation, but leaning toward supporting a disposition favoring
that party, may do so because of arguments found in an amicus brief in support of that party.");
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 781 n.129 (imagining individualized exceptions to this
generalization, where amici clarify ambiguity over which position would conform to the Justice's beliefs).
29 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235,
235 (1999) ("Judging is a complex, case-specific, and subtle task... ;reducing the process to
the level of checking a box on a ballot discredits the responsibility with which federal judges
have been entrusted.").
30 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 781-82.
31 See, e.g., id. at 782.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 782-83.
34 See e.g. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
26

LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY

18-28, 123-50 (1994).

Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 783; see also Andrew P. Morriss, Private Amici
Curiae and the Supreme Court's 1997-1998 Term Employment Law Jurisprudence,7 WM. &
MARY BIL RTS. J. 823, 829 (1999) ("[A]mici's view of their own efforts is akin to that of
groups lobbying before Congress.").
35
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have lifetime tenure and guaranteed compensation, should not care about
the political demands of organized groups. 3 6 However, numerous studies
show that the Supreme Court reacts to changes in public opinion. 37 Because disparities in amicus support demonstrate where public opinion
lies, the Interest Group Model predicts that the greater the disparity of
support for one side, the more likely the Court will rule for that particular

side. 38 Thus, "[t]he fact that [an] organization saw fit to file the brief is
the important datum, not the legal arguments or the background informa-

39
tion set forth between the covers of the brief."
Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill took a major step toward resolving the debate with their comprehensive analysis of amicus
participation from 1946 through 1995.40 The authors assembled a
database of every argued case during the time period and recorded the
outcome of the case, the number of amicus briefs supporting each party,
and whether certain key institutional litigants 4 1 filed amicus briefs in the
case. 42 They assessed the impact of amicus filers by comparing success
rates to a benchmark rate of success for petitioners and respondents without regard to amicus support.4 3 Over the period examined, amici supporting petitioners had little impact; they succeeded at a rate less than 1
percent higher than the benchmark rate.44 In contrast, amici supporting
respondents succeeded at a rate more than 7 percent higher than the
45
benchmark rate.
36 See Keamey & Merrill, supra note 7, at 784-85 (offering two possible rebuttals: Justices may adopt the positions of the most influential interest groups because they are concerned
with (1) enhancing their own reputations or (2) legitimizing the Court, itself).
37 Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 810. Collins also suggests an interesting potential intersection between the Interest Group and Strategic Actor Models: "[T]he [Jiustices only share
policymaking authority with the other branches of government. Should they stray too far from
public opinion on an issue, it is likely that the legislature may attempt to alter or override their
decision or the executive may indifferently enforce the decision." Id. at 812-13.
38 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 786 ("Insofar as the Justices are assumed to
try to resolve cases in accordance with the weight of public opinion, they should look to
amicus briefs as a barometer of opinion on both sides of the issue.").
39 Id. at 786.
40 See id. at 744. But cf. Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 828 (noting that the Kearney &
Merrill study did not control for established influences on litigation success).
41 Kearney and Merrill looked specifically at the Solicitor General, the ACLU, the AFLCIO, and state attorneys general. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 801.
42 Id. at 749.
43 See id. at 789-90 (finding that petitioners are successful 60 percent of the time, respondents are successful 37 percent of the time, and that there are mixed results 3 percent of
the time).
44 See id. at 791 fig.7, 792 (noting variation amongst decades, with success as low as
4.38 percent below the benchmark from 1946-1955 and as high as 8.97 percent above the
benchmark from 1956-1965).
45 See id. at 792 (highlighting that filers supporting respondents have consistently outperformed the benchmarks during the period examined).
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Each of the institutional litigants examined had success rates that
exceeded the benchmark rate, whether supporting the petitioner or respondent. 46 However, only the Solicitor General had a statistically significant impact on outcomes for both petitioners and respondents. 47 The
Solicitor General also had the most extensive impact on outcomes,
roughly doubling the odds of a petitioner win when supporting the petitioner and halving the odds of a petitioner win when supporting the respondent.48 The study also found that "amicus briefs cited by the Court
appear to be no more likely to be associated with the winning side than
briefs not cited by the Court" and that "briefs filed by more experienced
lawyers may be more successful than briefs filed by less experienced
'49
lawyers."
Kearney and Merrill cautiously interpret their results as providing
the most support for the Legal Model. 50 The results threaten the Attitudinal Model because amicus briefs appear to affect success rates in a
variety of contexts. 5 1 The results also challenge the Interest Group
Model because large disparities of amicus support for one side relative to
the other do not result in a substantially greater likelihood of success for
the supported party. 52 Consistent with the Legal Model, amicus briefs
generally succeed more often when filed by experienced lawyers and institutional litigants-filers with a better sense of what information the
Court finds useful. 53 Kearney and Merrill do not suggest that the Legal
Model provides the sole explanation for Supreme Court decisions or that
their study provides no support for the rival models. 54 They simply interpret their findings to suggest that amicus briefs that speak to the requirements of the law exert some influence on the outcomes reached by
55
the Court.
Paul Collins further illuminated the impact of amici participation by
empirically testing two hypotheses: (1) an Affected Groups Hypothesis,
which posits that an advantage of amicus participants,relative to one's
46 See id. at 803-10 (providing graphical representations of success against the benchmark for each litigant by decade).
47 See id. at 810-11 (finding that the ACLU had a statistically significant impact only on
the petitioner's side and that the AFL-CIO and state attorneys general had statistically significant impacts only on the respondent's side).
48 See id.
49 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 749.
50 Id. at 750.
51 See id.
52 See id.; see also Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 825 ("With results indicating that
cosigning amicus briefs does not play a statistically significant role in increasing litigation
success, a consideration of why groups choose to pursue this method of participation is clearly
warranted.").
53 See Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 827.
54 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 819.
55 See id.
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opponent, will increase the likelihood of litigation success, 56 and (2) an
Information Hypothesis, which posits that an advantage of amicus briefs,
relative to one's opponent, will increase the likelihood of litigation success. 57 His analysis "shows strong support that it is amicus brief support
that increases the probability of litigation success, and not amicus participant support. '5 8 Consistent with Kearney and Merrill's appraisal, Collins' findings suggest that "the Court values the information found within
amicus briefs and not the information found on the covers of these
briefs."' 59 Importantly, Collins' analysis also revealed that "[w]hen a petitioner of a certain ideology argues that position before a Court of the
same ideology, the likelihood of success increases ten percentage
points."60
Like Kearney and Merrill, Collins concludes that neither the Attitudinal nor Interest Group Models adequately depict the Court's decisionmaking. 6' "While ideological factors do play an important role in party
success before the Court, [Collins'] results indicate that so too do legal
factors."'62 Further, the Justices do not appear to respond to the influence of interest group opinion on a case-by-case basis. 63 Collins ultimately prefers an integrated model for the Court's decision that
64
recognizes its complexity and incorporates numerous approaches.
B.

The Function of the Solicitor General

"[T]he Solicitor General is responsible for any and all actions on
65
behalf of the United States government before the Supreme Court.
That responsibility brings the Solicitor General before the Court with
singular frequency; between 1959 and 1989, the Solicitor General participated in 48.5 percent of all cases decided on the merits and 58.8 percent
of all cases argued orally. 66 The Solicitor General decides which cases
warrant a petition for certiorari, writes briefs in support of or opposing
certiorari, writes briefs on the merits, presents oral arguments on the govSee Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 815.
See id. at 816.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id. at 823.
See id. at 827.
62 Id.
63 Id. In his conclusion, however, Collins recognizes that he did not test the possibility
that the Court reacts to affected groups in the form of briefs and not participants. See id. at
56
57
58
59
60
61

828.

64 Id. at 827 ("As such, I believe that judicial scholars may be better served by approaching Supreme Court decisionmaking as a complex phenomenon, perhaps best explained through

the integration of numerous approaches, rather than by outright adopting a particular perspective on the choice justices make.").
65 REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLIcrrOR GENERAL: THE POLITCS OF LAW 13 (1992).
66 See id. at 21.
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ernment's behalf before the Court or authorizes others to do so, and submits amicus curiae briefs to the Court when the government has a
67
particular interest in the case.
The Solicitor General has shown tremendous success in its various
duties. 68 The Solicitor General has been 5 percent more successful than
the average litigant at opposing certiorari. 69 The Solicitor General's success as a petitioner is astounding-it successfully obtains review fourteen times as often as private litigators. 70 The Solicitor General
maintains its success at the merits stage of the trial where, between 1959
and 1989, the government's position prevailed 67.6 percent of the time,
clearly failed 26.8 percent of the time, and obtained some mixed result
4.8 percent of the time. 71 All other factors being equal, if the Solicitor
General is present as a petitioner, the odds of a petitioner win are effectively doubled and the Solicitor General is present as a respondent, the
odds of a petitioner win are effectively halved. 72 The Solicitor General
also maintains extensive success as an amicus curiae, which I detail in
the remaining sections.
C. Previous Studies of the Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae
Several other authors have empirically examined the Solicitor General's amicus curiae participation. 73 In their comprehensive study of
amicus influence, Kearney and Merrill took particular note of the Solicitor General. 74 They dubbed the Solicitor General the "king of the citation-frequency hill" as the Court referred to the Solicitor General's brief
in just over 40 percent of the cases in which the Solicitor General appeared as an amicus curiae between 1946 and 1995.75 "Significantly, the
frequency of the Court's citation of the Solicitor General as amicus rises
each decade, roughly doubling between the first decade of [the] study
and the [last]." ' 76 Kearney and Merrill interpret this finding to suggest
Id.

at 12-13.
See generally id. at 22-30 (chronicling the Solicitor General's successes in its various
roles between 1959 and 1989).
69 See id. at 25 (noting the Solicitor General's 96 percent success rate, compared to the
67
68

overall success rate of 91 percent between 1959 and 1989).
70 Between 1959 and 1989, the Solicitor General successfully obtained review 69.78
percent of the time, compared to the 4.9 percent success rate of private litigation. See id.
(attributing this success to the Solicitor General's opportunity to select cases which would
likely warrant petition).
71 See id. at 29.
72 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 800.
73

See generally SALOKAR, supra note 65, at 145-50 (surveying the existing empirical

literature on the success of the Solicitor General as an amicus curiae in the Supreme Court).
74 See Keamey & Merrill, supra note 7, at 749-50.
75 See id. at 760.
76 Id.
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that the Court has come to rely more heavily on the Solicitor General's
7v
amicus filings in the writing of opinions.
More importantly, Keamey and Merrill uncovered an impressive
success rate and impact on outcomes for the Solicitor General as amicus
curiae. When the Solicitor General supported the petitioner, the petitioner won 76.3 percent of the time. 78 When the Solicitor General sup79
ported the respondent, the petitioner won just 34.1 percent of the time.
These rates depart significantly from the historical petitioner win rate of
59.8 percent.8 0 After conducting a multivariate regression, 8' Kearney
and Merrill found that the Solicitor General exerted a statistically significant influence on outcomes for both the petitioner's and respondent's
side. 82 The Solicitor General more than doubles the odds of a petitioner
win when supporting the petitioner and halves the odds of a petitioner
win when supporting the respondent, as compared to cases where the
83
Solicitor General had not filed as a party or amicus.
Jeffery A. Segal conducted a thorough examination of the Solicitor
General's amicus participation in the Warren and Burger Courts. 84 Over
those thirty years, the Solicitor General won about 75 percent of the
time, 85 and "no administration won less than 65 percent of its cases as
amicus."'86 The most successful administration of the period was Kennedy's-the Court ruled in favor of the party supported by the Solicitor
General in 87.5 percent of the cases in which it filed an amicus curiae
brief.87 Segal then looked at the success of each Solicitor General, finding a similar range of success rates-a low of 66.7 percent and a high of
87.7 percent. 88 The Solicitor General's high success rate remained consistent, even when briefs were broken down by issue, liberal versus con89
servative, and the presiding Chief Justice.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 790, 803. The figure of 76.3 percent was obtained by adding the historical
petitioner win rate and the percentage change in petitioner win rate for cases where the Solici-

tor General appears as amicus supporting petitioner.
79 See id. at 790, 804. The figure of 34.1 percent was obtained by subtracting the percentage change in petitioner win rate for cases where the Solicitor General appears as amicus
supporting respondent from the historical petitioner win rate.
80 See id. at 790.
81 See id. 847-55 (explaining and presenting the results of the multivariate regression).
82 Id. at 810.

83 See id. at 811, 852 (finding that the presence of the Solicitor General as an amicus for
the petitioner increases the odds of a petitioner win by a factor of 2.5006 and that the presence
of the Solicitor General as an amicus for the respondent reduces the odds of a petitioner win by
a factor of 0.3657).
84 See Segal, supra note 1, at 135.
85 Id. at 136.
86 Id. at 138.
87 Id.

88 Id. at 139 tbl.5.
89 See id. at 137, 139-41 tbls.2, 6, 7, & 8.
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Segal also analyzed the behavior of each Justice that served in the
Warren and Burger Courts. 90 After Justice Burton, who only participated
in twenty-two cases where the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief,
Chief Justice Warren voted for the party supported by the Solicitor General most often (79.7 percent), followed by Justice Goldberg (76.7 percent). 9 1 Justice Stevens was the only Justice to side with the Solicitor
General less than half the time (49.1 percent). 92 He was followed by
Justice Harlan (50.3 percent), and after that then-Associate Justice Rehnquist (51.1 percent). 9 3 Segal further found that thirteen of the twenty
Justices examined registered statistically significant differences in their
reactions to liberal and conservative briefs. 94 Of those Justices registering statistically significant differences, Justice Marshall sat at one extreme, supporting 86 percent of liberal briefs and only 26 percent of
conservative briefs. 95 Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist was at the other
extreme, supporting 77 percent of conservative briefs and just 39 percent
96
of liberal briefs.
Using the same data set as Segal, Collins calculated the change in
predicted probability of a petitioner win caused by the Solicitor General
filing an amicus brief.9 7 When supporting the petitioner, the Solicitor
General raised the probability of a petitioner win by 14.8 percent. 98
When supporting the respondent, the Solicitor General lowered the
probability of a petitioner win by 23.6 percent. 99
II.

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

AS AMICUS CURIAE

A.

Methods

This Note analyzes the sixty-four cases during the 2005-2006 and
2006-2007 Supreme Court terms in which the Solicitor General filed an
amicus brief on the merits that clearly supported one party and the Court
issued a decision on the merits that clearly supported one party. Data
collection began by searching the Solicitor General's website, which lists
all briefs submitted by the office since 1998.100 I examined the briefs
90 See id. at 141 tbl.8.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.

94 Id. at 141-42 (employing the ideology coding used in Spaeth's Supreme Court
database).
95 Id. at 141 tbl.8, 142.
96 Id.
97 See Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 821-23, 824 tbl.3.
98 Id. at 823 tbl.2.
99 Id.
100 See Office of the Solicitor General, supra note 3.
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submitted on the merits in 2005 and 2006 to determine the cases in
which the Solicitor General clearly supported a party. Using Westlaw, I
determined which of these cases had decisions on the merits that clearly
favored a party. These searches yielded the sixty-four cases listed in
Appendix A.
For each case, I determined which party the Solicitor General supported by referencing its brief or, if the brief was unclear, the case's
syllabus.10 1 I established which party the Court's decision and each Justice favored by examining each opinion.' 0 2 Finally, I searched the text of
each set of opinions for the words "amici" or "amicus" to determine
whether the majority opinion cited or made explicit reference to the Solicitor General or the Solicitor General's brief.
The statistical results presented infra Part II.B were calculated with
simple counting and arithmetic. Because the analysis is neither predictive nor a random sampling to describe a greater population, significance
or confidence calculations are inappropriate. The analysis is instead intended to describe the sample itself.
B.

Results

TABLE

A:

DATA ON COURT TOTALS

Number of Cases (N)

64

Number of Cases Won by Party Supported by SG

57

Percentage of Cases Won by Party Supported by SG

89.06%

Of the sixty-four cases in which the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief on the merits that clearly supported one party and the Court
issued a decision on the merits that clearly supported one party, the decision favored the party supported by the Solicitor General in fifty-seven
(89.06 percent) of the cases. (See Table A.)

101 As implied above, if neither the brief nor the syllabus were clear, I left the case out of
the analysis. See supra note 3.
102 1 recognize a degree of inaccuracy presented by ignoring the fact that concurring or
dissenting Justices may have concurred in only part of the judgment, meaning that their actual
positions, with reference to the parties, are somewhat mixed. If a Justice concurred in the
judgment, I listed that Justice as favoring the same party as the Court. If a Justice dissented in
the judgment, I listed that Justice as favoring the opposite party as the Court.
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TABLE

B: DATA ON RESPONDENTS

Number of Cases (N)

64

Number of Respondent Wins

19

Percentage of Cases Won by Respondent

29.69%

Number of Cases Where SG Supported Respondent

22

Number of Respondent Wins When SG Supported Respondent

17

Percentage of Cases where SG Supported Respondent Won by
Respondent

77.27%

Of the sixty-four cases in the sample, the Court ruled in favor of the
respondent in nineteen (29.69 percent) of the cases. (See Table B.) The
Solicitor General supported the respondent in twenty-two cases. The respondent won judgment in seventeen (77.27 percent) of those cases.
TABLE C: DATA ON PETITIONERS
Number of Cases (N)

64

Number of Petitioner Wins

45

Percentage of Cases Won by Petitioner

70.31%

Number of Cases Where SG Supported Petitioner Wins

42

Number of Petitioner Wins When SG Supported Petitioner

40

Percentage of Cases where SG Supported Petitioner Won by
Petitioner

95.24%

Of the sixty-four cases in the sample, the Court ruled in favor of the
respondent in forty-five (70.31 percent) of the cases. (See Table C.) The
Solicitor General supported the respondent in forty-two cases. The petitioner won in forty (95.24 percent) of those cases.
It may be illustrative to state these statistics from the perspective of
the parties. While respondents won judgment in 29.69 percent of all
cases, they won 77.27 percent of the cases where they were supported by
the Solicitor General and just 4.76 percent of the cases where they were
opposed by the Solicitor General. Alternatively, while petitioners won
judgment in 70.31 percent of all cases, they won 95.24 percent of the
cases where they were supported by the Solicitor General and 22.73 percent of the cases where they were opposed by the Solicitor General.
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DATA ON UNANIMOUS DECISIONS

Number of Cases (N)

64

Number of Unanimous Decisions in Sample

33

Percentage of Sample with Unanimous Decisions

51.56%

Number of Cases Won by Party Supported by SG

57

Number of Unanimous Decisions in Favor of Party Supported by SG

30

Percentage of Cases Won by Party Supported by SG with a
Unanimous Decision

52.63%

Percentage of Unanimous Decisions Won by the Party Supported by
the SG

90.91%

Thirty-three (51.56 percent) of the sixty-four cases in the sample
had unanimous decisions.10 3 (See Table D.) Thirty (52.6 percent) of the
fifty-seven cases won by the party supported by the Solicitor General had
a unanimous decision. Of the cases with a unanimous decision, 90.91
percent of those cases were won by the party supported by the Solicitor
General.
TABLE

E:

DATA ON INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

Justice

Number of Cases
Participated in

Number of Cases
Decided in Favor
of Same Party
Supported by
Solicitor General

Percentage of
Cases Decided in
Favor of Same
Party Supported
by Solicitor
General

Rank (From
highest % to
lowest)

Roberts

63

54

85.71%

3

Stevens

64

35

54.69%

9

Scalia

64

53

82.81%

4

Kennedy

63

58

92.06%

2

Souter

64

46

71.88%

6

Thomas

62

51

82.26%

5

Ginsburg

64

45

70.31%

7

Breyer

64

44

68.75%

8

Alito

51

47

92.16%

1

The newest Justice, Justice Alito, voted in favor of the party supported by the Solicitor General at a higher rate-92.16 percent-than
any of his colleagues (See Table E). Justice Kennedy follows closely
behind with a rate 92.06 percent. Chief Justice Roberts ranks third, siding with the Solicitor General 85.71 percent of the time. The most senior
Justice, Justice Stevens, voted in favor of the party supported by the Solicitor General least often, at a rate of 54.69 percent. Justice Breyer is far
103 By "unanimous," I mean that all Justices participating in the case favored the same

party.
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behind Alito with the next lowest rate, 68.75 percent. The data and sta-

tistics for the other Justices are listed on Table E.
TABLE

F:

DATA ON REFERENCES

Number of Cases (N)

64

Number of Majority Opinions with Explicit Mentions of the SG

18

Percentage of Majority Opinions with Explicit Mentions of the SG

28.13%

Number of Majority Opinions with Explicit Mentions or Citations

27

Percentage of Majority Opinions with Explicit Mentions or Citations

42.19%

Number of Cases in which Any Opinion Explicitly Mentions or Cites
the SG

34

Percentage of Cases in which Any Opinion Explicitly Mentions or
Cites the SG

53.13%

Number of Cases Won by the Side Supported by the SG

57

Number of Cases Won by the Side Supported by the SQ where the
Majority Opinion Explicitly Mentioned or Cited the SG

21

Percentage of Cases Won by the Side Supported by the SG where the
Majority Opinion Explicitly Mentioned or Cited the SG

36.84%

Number of Cases Lost by the Side Supported by the SQ

7

Number of Cases Lost by the Side Supported by the SQ where the
Majority Explicitly Mentioned or Cited the SG

6

Percentage of Cases Lost by the Side Supported by the SG where the
Majority Explicitly Mentioned or Cited the SQ
Percentage of Cases where the Majority Opinion Explicitly Mentioned
or Cited the SG Won by the Side Supported by the SG
Percentage of Cases where the Majority Opinion Explicitly Mentioned
or Cited the SG Lost by the Side Supported by the SG

85.71%
77.78%
22.22%

In thirty-four (53.13 percent) of the cases, at least one opinion explicitly mentioned or cited the Solicitor General or his amicus brief. The
majority explicitly mentioned or cited the Solicitor General in twentyseven (42.19 percent) of the sixty-four cases. (See Table F.) The side
supported by the Solicitor General won in 77.78 percent of the cases
where the majority explicitly mentioned or cited the Solicitor General.
The majority explicitly mentioned or cited the Solicitor General in 36.84
percent of the cases won by the party supported by the Solicitor General
and 85.71 percent-all but one-of the cases lost by the party supported
by the Solicitor General.
IV.
A.

DiscusSION OF FINDINGS

Comparison to PriorFindings

The Solicitor General clearly experienced greater success as an amicus curiae between the Fall 2005 and Spring 2007 terms than it had dur-
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ing earlier periods. 10 4 The Solicitor General's success rate from this
period (89.06 percent) exceeds the success rate from the Warren and
Burger Courts (about 75 percent). 0 5 The success rate in my sample also
exceeds the success rate of the most successful Solicitor General in Se10 6
gal's study, J. Lee Rankin (87.5 percent).
The win rate for petitioners supported by the Solicitor General from
this period (95.24 percent) far surpassed the rate from the period between
1946 and 1995 (76.3 percent). 0 7 The win rate for respondents supported
by the Solicitor General from 2005 to 2007 (77.27 percent) also significantly exceeded the rate from 1946 to 1995 (65.9 percent). These statistics may be misleading because the voting pattern of the Court between
2005 and 2007 was different than it was between 1946 and 1995.
08
Whereas petitioners won 70.31 percent of the cases in my sample,'
they won 59.8 percent of the cases between 1946 and 1995.1°9 Part of
this difference can be explained by the fact that Kearney and Merrill
included cases with mixed results, which accounted for about 3 percent
of the cases.110 But even if those mixed results are removed from the
sample, petitioners won only 61.65 percent of the cases in their sample. I"' The historical comparison is more accurate, therefore, if stated in
terms of differences in win rates. Between 1946 and 1995, petitioners
supported by the Solicitor General won 16.5 percent more often than the
average petitioner;1 12 between 2005 and 2007, that figure rose to 24.93
percent-a difference of 8.43 percent. While the Solicitor General's recent success as an amicus supporting petitioners has soundly exceeded
historical rates in recent years, its success supporting respondents has
increased even more dramatically. Between 1946 and 1995, respondents
supported by the Solicitor general won 25.7 percent more often than the
average respondent;"13 between 2005 and 2007, that figure spiked to
47.58 percent-a difference of 21.88 percent.
The individual Justices are now siding with the Solicitor General
more often as well. Whereas only one Justice voted for the party sup104 See generally Collins Jr., supra note 10; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7.
105 See Segal, supra note 1, at 136. The Kearney & Merrill study did not provide a total
success rate for the Solicitor General. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7.
106 See Segal, supra note 1, at 138.
107 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 790, 803. Win rate for petitioners supported
by the Solicitor General is calculated by using the benchmark rate of success (Figure 6) plus
the percentage change in petitioner win rate for cases where the Solicitor General appears as
amicus for the petitioner (Figure 13). Id.
108 The statistic for the time-frame would be more accurate if the study examined all cases
decided by the Court on the merits.
109 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 790.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 Id. at 790, 803
''3

Id.
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ported by the Solicitor General more than 80 percent of the time between
1953 and 1982,114 five Justices fell into that category between 2005 and
2007. Justice Alito had the highest rate of agreement in my sample, with
92.16 percent, edging out Justice Burton, who had the highest rate in
Segal's sample, with 90.9 percent. 1 5 The agreement rates of the Justices
from the Warren and Burger Courts dropped off after Justice Burtonthe next highest were Chief Justice Warren, with 79.7 percent, and Justice Goldberg, with 76.7 percent. 1 6 In contrast, Justice Alito was followed closely by Justice Kennedy, with 92.06 percent. Chief Justice
Roberts was not far behind with 85.71 percent. Although Justice Stevens
remained the strongest opponent of the Solicitor General, his rate of
agreement rose from 49.1 percent 17 to 54.69 percent.
Given the Solicitor General's increased success, it is no surprise that
the Court referenced the Solicitor General about 13 percent more often
between 2005 and 2007 than it did been between 1946 and 1995.118
B.

Interpretation of Findings

The results of this study should be considered in light of the reasons
for and limitations resulting from the sample used. The purpose of this
Note was to answer a simple, empirical question: How often has the
young Roberts Court (and its constituent Justices) ruled (or voted) in
favor of the party supported by the Solicitor General? Accordingly, the
sample of cases analyzed was limited to the sixty-four cases during the
2005 and 2006 Supreme Court terms in which (1) the Solicitor General
filed an amicus brief on the merits that clearly supported one party and
(2) the Court issued a decision on the merits that clearly supported one
party. This sample pales in comparison to the hundreds of cases analyzed by Kearney and Merrill and by Segal. 1 9 Their studies were each
more ambitious, attempting to explain the Court's behavior.' 20 This
Note is primarily descriptive-any inferences from the results regarding
causation or future behavior are made cautiously due to the limited sample size and simplicity of analysis.
These restrictions also prevent fully comprehensive analysis of the
Solicitor General's amicus participation because the sample ignores two
114
115

See Segal, supra note 1, at 141 tbl.8.
See id.

116 See id.

117 See id.
118 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 760.
119 See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7 (using a sample of cases from
1946-1995); Segal, supra note I (using a sample of cases from 1953-1982).
120 See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7 (analyzing three models of judicial
decision-making); Segal, supra note 1, at 141-42 (discussing factors affecting Justices' sup-

port for the solicitor general).
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categories of what I will call "mixed" cases: (1) cases where the Solicitor
General argued for a legal position that was not in line with the position
of either party and (2) cases where the Court issued a decision that was
not clearly in either party's favor. In both sets of cases, the Solicitor
General may have a meaningful, though subtle, interaction with the
Court. However, this Note is far less concerned with those causal interactions than the sheer degree of agreement between the Court and the
Solicitor General. Inclusion of the mixed cases would severely complicate the analysis while not revealing anything further about the branches'
concord. Future, intricate analysis should include these cases to obtain a
better reflection of the Solicitor General's role as an amicus curiae.
As alluded to above, the key contribution of this Note is the determination that the Roberts Court sided with the parties supported by the
Solicitor General 89.06 percent of the time during its first two terms.
Stated another way, when the Solicitor General was not a party, the party
whose position was more in line with executive policy won judgment
nearly nine times out of ten. As discussed below, the Court may or may
not share the policy preferences of the executive branch. But speaking
strictly in terms of policy outcomes and assuming that the Solicitor General bases its support on executive policy preferences, the Roberts Court
has generally facilitated those policy preferences. As demonstrated in
Part II.A, this degree of policy coordination is historically unparalleled. 12 ' By the same token, the individual Justices' votes are also coordinated with executive policy preferences at historic rates. Justices
Kennedy and Alito both sided with the Solicitor General more than nine
times out of ten. Even the so-called "liberal [J]ustices,"' 22 with the exception of Justice Stevens, all voted for the party supported by the Solicitor General in over 68 percent of the cases in the sample.
Causal issues aside, the Court also seems to have a clear consciousness of the Solicitor General's participation. Within the sample, the majority explicitly mentioned the Solicitor General in more than one quarter
of the cases, and at least one opinion either explicitly mentioned or cited
the Solicitor General in more than half the cases. Interestingly, however,
reference in opinions did not translate into success within the sub-sample
of cases where the Solicitor General is explicitly mentioned by the majority; the Solicitor General actually had a lower success rate (77.78 percent) than it did in the entire sample (89.06 percent). This drop-off
results from the fact that the majority opinion mentioned the Solicitor
121 This assertion comes with the caveat that I could not find studies of the Solicitor

General's amicus participation from 1995-2005.
122 See generally Alexander Tahk & Stephen Jessee, Supreme Court Ideology Project,
http://sct.tahk.us/ (last visited September 30, 2008) (using Bayesian ideal point estimation to

measure the Justices' ideologies).
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General in all but one of the cases that it "lost," and only 36.84 percent
of the cases that it "won." I hesitantly interpret these statistics to suggest
that the Court feels a degree of accountability toward the Solicitor General. When the Court decides against the Solicitor General, it may feel
the need to justify any departures from the government's position. This
accountability, if actually present, might be evidence of the Solicitor
General's authority before the Court and of its influence on the Court's
decisions. This chain of inferences is patently attenuated, however. If
accountability exists, it may be merely nominal, existing in the absence
of influence. The accountability itself may be absent as well. That inference is drawn from a sample of the Solicitor General's seven losseshardly a large enough sample to warrant confident generalization. With
that in mind, the best conclusion that can be drawn from the Court's
reference to the Solicitor General is that the Justices at least take notice
of its arguments, especially when it disagrees with them.
Despite these analytical difficulties, nihilism toward the causal
question would be cowardly. The Court behaves differently when the
Solicitor General is an amicus. A petitioner supported by the Solicitor
General is more likely to win than the average petitioner, and a respondent supported by the Solicitor General is more likely to win than the
average respondent. This variation must be caused by something. 123 We
can make at least modest progress toward finding out what that something is with this Note's analysis and the aid of previous studies of amicus participation. Broadly speaking, there seem to be three potential
causal explanations for the fact that the Court usually rules in favor of
the party supported by the Solicitor General:
(1) The Court, in its decisions, is influenced by the Solicitor General's position;
(2) The Solicitor General, in selecting which party to
support, is influenced by how the Court is likely to
rule; or
(3) The Court's judgment and the Solicitor General's
decision over which party to support are caused by
external variables, rather than any interaction between the two actors.
There are reasons for accepting and rejecting each explanation. Further,
it is possible that more than one of these explanations work in
combination.
The first causal explanation has two primary variants, corresponding to different models of judicial decision-making. Under the Legal
123 I will spare the reader a metaphysical discourse on whether everything is necessarily
caused by something else.
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Model, 124 the Solicitor General's success should be attributable to its
ability to provide the Court with persuasive legal arguments. The Solicitor General's office "repeatedly receives high grades for the quality of its
legal arguments."' 1 5 The conventional wisdom is that the Solicitor General is uniquely successful because it "speaks with special authority."1 26
Still, the same realist skepticism that is levied against the Legal Model
itself can be deployed against this explanation. 127 Alternatively, the
Court may simply defer to the interests of the executive branch under a
more Attitudinal- or Interest Group-based Model. 12 8 This conception
also has its weaknesses. While one might suggest that Justices defer to
the views of the Solicitor General for strategic reasons or because they
assume that the executive branch will endorse politically popular positions, the Solicitor General often files amicus briefs on issues as to which
the executive branch has had little or no views or preferences 129
Claims that the Solicitor General brings a distinctive and influential
reputation to the Supreme Court have little empirical foundation.' 30 No
direct evidence suggests that the Solicitor General's success results from
careful case-selection or a reputation for neutrality and political independence. 131 Like this study, prior empirical assessments of the Solicitor
General's success tend to consider only the Solicitor General's presence
or absence in litigation, and neglect the extent to which qualities attributed to the Solicitor General might be found amongst other parties and
amici appearing before the Court.' 32 The key to the Solicitor General's
success may simply be the Office's extraordinary experience before the
Court.'

33

Repeat players enjoy "a substantial measure of success over

the less frequent litigant." 34 "They benefit from advance intelligence,
access to specialists, a wide range of resources, expertise, opportunities
to build informal relations with the Court, and a high degree of credibil124 See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
125 See Segal, supra note 1, at 138 (offering Justice Brennan's observation that the "ablest
advocates in the U.S. are advocates in the Solicitor General's Office")
126 See Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51
POL. RES. Q. 505, 510 (1998) (quoting Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECiSION-MAKING 112, 115 (Glendon Schubert ed.,
1963)).
127 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 24-39.
129 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 818.
130 See McGuire, supra note 126, at 505. "The great difficulty with such analysis is that
its theoretical foundation rests on a circular argument: The basis for the prediction that the
solicitor general will win-that the federal government will succeed because of its unique status
in the eyes of the Justices-is based largely upon the knowledge that the solicitor general
prevails more often than any other litigant." Id. at 508.
131 See id. at 507.
132 See id. at 507-08; see, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7.
133 See McGuire, supra note 126, at 506-07.
134 See SALOrAR, supra note 65, at 31.
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ity before the Court."' 135 In fact, Kevin McGuire's work indicates that
the impact of Solicitor General on outcomes (when appearing at oral argument) disappears completely when one controls for overall litigation
36
experience. 1
McGuire's findings deserve three important qualifications, however.
First, his data set is limited to cases argued between 1977 and 1982.137
Because his results were statistically significant, the narrowness of his
data set is not much of a problem itself. However, the age of his data set
makes extrapolation of his findings difficult. The nature of the Solicitor
General's impact on outcomes may look different now than it did twenty
five years ago; its success certainly does. Second, McGuire only considered the impact of litigants appearing at oral argument,1 38 failing to focus
on the particular impact of amici curiae. The Solicitor General may influence Court outcomes differently as an amicus than it does in the
broader sample of cases in which it appears as a party. Finally, even if
the Solicitor General's success "is simply an artifact of superior litigation
experience,"' 139 the Solicitor General still holds a unique role. It is the
definitive repeat player. 140 While the Court might not respond directly to
the fact that the Solicitor General speaks for the federal government, the
Solicitor General's unparalleled litigation experience, to which the Court
apparently does respond, is surely attributable to its unique client. Stated
otherwise, while the Solicitor General may differ from other Supreme
Court litigants only in degree and not in kind, that difference is enormous
and results directly from the fact that it represents the executive branch.
All of that aside, McGuire' s work does not really challenge the hypothesis that the Solicitor General's presence as an amicus influences Court
outcomes; at most, he bounds that influence and rejects its conventional
justification.
The second causal hypothesis is that the Solicitor General succeeds
so often because it simply supports the side most likely to win. This
hypothesis does find some support in the results of this Note's analysis.
If the Solicitor General supported "favorites" with some regularity, unanimous decisions should tend to fall with the party supported by the Solicitor General. This prediction is based on the conservative premise that
cases with unanimous decisions-uniting an ideologically diverse
135 See id.

136 See McGuire, supra note 126, at 511-16 (analyzing data on all orally argued cases in
the Supreme Court from 1977 to 1982). McGuire also tested the hypothesis that litigation
experience had a disproportionate benefit on the Solicitor General's success and found no
unique effect. See id. at 519-20.
137 Id. at 511-12.
138 Id. at 512.
139 Id. at 511.

140 SALOKAR, supra note 65, at 31.
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Court-were probably doctrinally easy cases with predictable outcomes.
Indeed, 90.91 percent of the unanimous decisions in the sample favored
the party supported by the Solicitor General.' 4 1 Positing for the moment
that the Solicitor General placed its support with projected winners, the
Solicitor General got most of the easy cases right. But considering that
only 52.63 percent of the Solicitor General's wins had unanimous decisions, a large portion of its success is left unexplained. The Solicitor
General was only slightly less successful in cases without unanimous
decisions, supporting the winning party in 87.1 percent of those cases.
Although it is possible that the Solicitor General bases its support on
remarkable predictive skills, there is no clear empirical support for that
conclusion in my analysis.
Collins tested the general hypothesis that amici are a priori more
likely to file briefs with the winning side. 142 During the period examined, 1953-1985, petitioners and respondents were supported by
roughly the same number of amicus briefs and participants, despite the
petitioner's well-recognized advantage in the Court.' 43 Further, the
mean number of briefs filed in support of the predicted winner differed
minimally and statistically insignificantly from the number filed in support of the predicted loser. 144 "These tests provide evidence that amici
do not self-select winners, or that they are not very good at it if they
do . . .145 However, the Solicitor General may be an exception to this
general rule for at least two reasons. First, the Solicitor General appears
before the Court more often than other amici 146 and, as such, may be
especially self-conscious of its reputation before the Court. In cases
where the Executive has only marginal policy preferences, the Solicitor
General may support a predicted winner in order to bolster its reputation
for objectivity. Second, the Solicitor General succeeds far more frequently than the average amicus. 147 In light of this singular success,
facts regarding the strategic behavior of the average amicus curiae should
not be hastily applied to the Solicitor General.
The final hypothesis is that the Solicitor General's success results
neither from the Solicitor General's influence on the Court nor a tendency for the Solicitor General to support the party most likely to win;
instead, some independent forces cause the Solicitor General and the
"

141
142
143
144

See
See
See
See

supra tbl.D.
Collins Jr., supra note 10, at 821-22.
id. at 821.
id. at 821-22 (predicting winners by running a logic model without amicus curiae

variables).
145 Id. at

822.

146 See id. (dubbing the Solicitor General the quintessential repeat player in Supreme
Court adjudication).
147 See supra note 1-5 and accompanying text.
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Court to favor the same parties. This hypothesis encompasses several
possible explanations, but I will focus on two. First, the Justices may
vote according to their own policy preferences, which just so happen to
be in line with the policy preferences of the Executive Branch. Unlike
the attitudinal variant of the first hypothesis-that the Court sides with
the Solicitor General out of deference to Executive policy preferencesthis hypothesis suggests that judges base their voting on independent policy preferences. 48 This explanation is threatened by the finding that liberal Justices voted for the party supported by a Solicitor General under
149
the direction of a Republican administration at relatively high rates.
The response is that conventional liberal policy preferences are not that
far from the conservative preferences of the Bush administration. This
response is, however, empirically unfounded 50 and anecdotally suspect.
If this variant were accurate, there would have been greater variation in
the Solicitor General's success rates across the different
administrations. 151

A second variant of the final hypothesis, in line with the Legal
Model, is that the Executive's policy preferences happen to be aligned
with the policy outcomes resulting from the Justices' legal approaches.
This variant seems better able to explain the across-the-Court coordination with the Solicitor General than the attitudinal variant. The premise
that outstanding jurists tend to agree on legal issues seems more intuitively plausible than the premise that they tend to have similar policy
preferences. But despite this intuitive appeal, the policy outcomes resulting from judges' votes actually vary significantly when all cases are examined. 152 Accordingly, the legal variant also fails to fully explain the
phenomenon.
In the end, the causal force behind the Solicitor General's success as
an amicus remains veiled. Each of the hypotheses suggested above has it
merits, and each is readily susceptible to criticism. McGuire's legal experience explanation is probably the least-contested explanation, but it
does not carry the inquiry particularly far from the starting point. Perhaps the Solicitor General's extraordinary experience does account for
148 Indirectly, the Executive still would play a role, because it is appointing the Justices.
However, the current Executive would not have the Court-wide influence that it would under
the attitudinal variant of the first hypothesis, because it would only have appointed a few
Justices.
149 See McGuire, supra note 126, at 512-13.

150 One might argue that the liberal Justices' rates of agreement are evidence that their
policy preferences are not far from "conservative" policy preferences. This argument puts the
cart before the horse, assuming what is to be proved-namely, that Justices vote according to
their policy preferences. Such a premise requires independent proof.
151 See Segal, supra note 1, at 139 tbl.4 (listing the success rates for Solicitors General, by
administration, during the Warren and Burger Courts).
152 See Tahk & Jessee, supra note 122.
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most of its success as an amicus; but what does that mean? Does this

experience actually influence the Court's decision-making? If so, how
does that experience translate into influence? Does the experience influence the Solicitor General's choice over which party to support? Or does
the experience operate in some other way?
The Solicitor General's success is probably best explained by a
combination of causes, in proportions yet unknown. My impression is
that the Solicitor General's success is mostly attributable to agreement
between the Executive Branch's policy preferences and the policy outcomes resulting from the Justices' legal approaches. Although the socalled "liberal" Justices may be clearly distinguishable from the so-called
"conservative" Justices, the possibility that the divergence between the
two sets of Justices is qualitatively not that great and quantitatively not
that frequent seems entirely reasonable. Nine of the nation's greatest
jurists should substantially agree on doctrine, disagreeing only at the
margins. If this explanation is valid, the Solicitor General's spike in success before the Roberts Court should be unsurprising. A Solicitor General representing a Republican administration should be more successful
when five conservative appointees sit on the court. 15 3 Presumably, nominees are selected for their likelihood to rule in favor of the administration's, and consequently, the political party's policy preferences. 54 But
despite the intuitive appeal of these explanations, they are empirically
unfounded or, at most, as empirically founded as the other explanations
presented above. The results of my analyses have presented two interesting questions: first, why was the Solicitor General so successful during
this period, and second, why was the Solicitor General more successful
during this period than it has been historically? I suspect that the ultimate answers to these two questions will be related. For now, however,
the purely descriptive conclusion-the Solicitor General's immense success as an amicus-must suffice.
CONCLUSION

This Note analyzed the Solicitor General's success as an amicus
curiae before the Supreme Court during the first two years of the Roberts
Court. It found that the party supported by the executive's advocate won
judgment nearly 90 percent of the time. This rate of success far sur153 See generally Robert Barnes, In Second Term, Roberts Court Defines Itself; Many 5 to
4 Decisions Reflect Narrowly Split Court That Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June 25,
2007, at A3.
154 This political explanation of judicial results does not require us to accept the Attitudinal Model of judicial decision-making. Judges may decide cases in accordance with their
understanding of the requirements of the authoritative sources of law relevant to the question
presented although the results obtained coincide with a distinctive policy outlook, like the
Executive's. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
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passes those from earlier periods. Correspondingly, the individual Justices consistently sided with the Solicitor General. All of the Justices
voted for the party supported by the Solicitor General more than half the
time, and all but one of the Justices did so more than two thirds of the
time.
The safest conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is purely descriptive: when the Solicitor General supported a party as an amicus, that
party won judgment at an exceptionally high rate. From this, we can
probably infer that the Court's policy outcomes were highly coordinated
with the Bush administration's policy preferences. Nonetheless, even
this seemingly safe inference requires the assumption that the Solicitor
General selects which party to support based upon its policy preferences.
The possibility that selections are based on other criteria, i.e., which
party is more likely to win is plausible and has not been empirically
rejected. However, the nature of the Solicitor General as the Executive's
advocate creates a strong intuitive impression that it most likely adopts
the position best aligned with the administration's policy preferences.
Consequently, I cautiously conclude that there has been a relatively high
degree of policy coordination between the Executive and the Judiciary
during the first two years of the Roberts Court.
Policy coordination has independent significance, because it represents how much, or, as in this case, how little, opposition the executive
faced in its policy goals from the judiciary. Many will be concerned with
the low level of opposition both in terms of the political result and the
structural implication. Those opposed to the policies of the Bush administration will be understandably concerned with the fact that the Court
tends to issue decisions in line with the administration's policies. The
Court may continue its alignment with the next administration if that
administration maintains policies substantially similar to those of the
Bush administration or it may offer significant resistance to an administration with substantially different policies. The Solicitor General's success may also have an implication that transcends mere partisanship and
goes to the structural root of our democracy. It may signal the erosion of
the separateness between the Executive and Judicial branches. The policy coordination revealed in this Note may be systematic rather than
merely coincidental. Perhaps the Court is abdicating its independence by
deferring a priori to the position of the presidential administration.
This separation of powers concern is certainly reasonable, but it depends upon causal inferences from the data. As Part II.B should have
demonstrated, there is no clear explanation for the Solicitor General's
success as of yet. Finding that explanation will take more intricate and
creative analysis than this Note-and, for that matter, the existing literature-has been able to muster. As is the custom in empirical work, I
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conclude by inviting further study of this curious phenomenon. While
this Note examined the period at the very beginning of the Roberts
Court, it also examined the end of the Bush administration. Time will
tell if the high degree of policy coordination was merely an aberration,
resulting from the particular administration, or a fairly stable phenomenon, resulting from the make-up of the Roberts Court, or a new fixture,
resulting from the nature of the modem Supreme Court.

2009]

567

POLICY COORDINATION

ci

.5

z
H.

E

Z'

Z4 a

e

z

. 14

t

0
co

Ca

.

C

;o 7
E

C

p

U

u

4

.0>

10101
Cn

0
aa

9p

.

o

568

00

a'

.)

[Vol. 18:541

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

o

OEU

U

m

0

0

0

z

z

z

10

z

0

0

0

z

z

z

:3o
0

0

E

lu

00

A5
E

"20,

0

im

0

05
0

00, e'

c

0

C
N

N(

D)(

a

Z
=

>
u

un

m
c'n~

0"

E
-

0
:d

n

w
00
-

6
M 0
1

v

.

.

.

N

(N
0~
0 '
"N fl
N

N

0 0
"
N

N

0ma
0
0
MN("NC
N

N

N

2009]

POLICY COORDINATION

0

0- )
o
0

)

az

0

z0

z0

z

a)

0

L

z

0

o0
0

u

~0

0

0

00

0

0

*0

Z0-

0

0

0E
000
0o

0

C

U

E
u

U

~

2

=0

o

>
0

~

Vm

~

o)wE

C-

>

U)0

Or
.0

C.' C
CA

Cl

00 oo-0000
In

n

tn

C)

V

'

0

'

.C)0

oo 0 C 0
0 W
C-- )

'f

t

570

[Vol. 18:541

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

r-vi cn ui vi ui
V)
=i~ :

~

~*
:

:

~-4'0
iC6U)
V:;
j

:

3

fl

2009]

POLICY COORDINATION

Uz

U

~

u.

Uz

0~iz

~z
z

z
0A
U

0..

0.

o

v.

L-o-L
tn
Ito

n

un c

U-,
It UWr
) Itn~~

)

-

572

[Vol. 18:541

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

C0
0

Q

C'm

0

0

z

z

0

z 4)

0

z

oo
0
r

0

4

)

0

a

0
(d2.

U

C

>

C

.

.

0.

0.

a4

". r. ..

r-

= Z

o

0.
0

X

0.

c-

0.

r.

0 . 0 u

0.

0

.

000

a..

a..

-C0

o.

.
u

u

-"
"

-

0

Z.

0.,
a.

'4 0

U

C'
0

C) r
0/)

'0

U
,C

C,
-

C,m

0

CrC tC Cfl

C)

)

C)

C'4 Cm

CI) Cl)
tn

2009]

POLICY COORDINATION

a

oo

.-. .=

U-~

o

0
0

0

U

I

0_

j

46

-~

zU
,..

"u

04

,
-1 u, V. m

00

N-

C14

V*)=N
V., 't

